Secret-Key Generation Using Compound Sources and One-Way Public
  Communication by Tavangaran, Nima et al.
1Secret-Key Generation Using Compound Sources
and One-Way Public Communication
Nima Tavangaran, Student Member, IEEE, Holger Boche, Fellow, IEEE, and Rafael F. Schaefer, Member, IEEE
Abstract—In the classical Secret-Key generation model, Com-
mon Randomness is generated by two terminals based on the
observation of correlated components of a common source, while
keeping it secret from a non-legitimate observer. It is assumed
that the statistics of the source are known to all participants.
In this work, the Secret-Key generation based on a compound
source is studied where the realization of the source statistic
is unknown. The protocol should guarantee the security and
reliability of the generated Secret-Key, simultaneously for all
possible realizations of the compound source. A single-letter
lower-bound of the Secret-Key capacity for a finite compound
source is derived as a function of the public communication rate
constraint. A multi-letter capacity formula is further computed
for a finite compound source for the case in which the public
communication is unconstrained. Finally a single-letter capacity
formula is derived for a degraded compound source with an
arbitrary set of source states and a finite set of marginal states.
Index Terms—Compound source, Secret-Key capacity, Com-
mon Randomness, hypothesis testing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Current cryptographic approaches are dependent on the
computational capabilities of the non-legitimate terminals. By
increasing technological advances, the security of transmitted
information can not be guaranteed for sure. In contrast, an
information theoretic approach provides us with a framework
for future coding schemes that guarantee security independent
of computational capabilities of the eavesdroppers.
Information theoretic security was first introduced by Shan-
non in [1]. In the so called one-time pad method, each
transmitting message is encrypted by a Secret-Key (SK). If there
is no SK available, it has to be generated first. One approach
is to generate a shared SK based on a common source. In
this model, two terminals observe correlated components of
a common source and communicate over a public noiseless
channel to generate a common SK. Afterwards, they can encrypt
subsequent communication using this SK. This procedure relies
on the generation of Common Randomness (CR) which was
introduced in [2] and later used by Maurer in [3] and Ahlswede
and Csisza´r in [4] to determine the SK capacity. The SK sharing
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is further studied in [5]–[9]. In practice, this kind of security
can be integrated in the physical layer of wireless systems [10].
However, in all these models which were used for SK
generation, perfect knowledge of the source statistics was
assumed. In a more general approach, the source uncertainty
should be taken into account where the terminals do not
have the knowledge of the actual realization of the source.
An achievable SK rate for a compound Discrete Memoryless
Multiple Source (DMMS) {(X,Ys, Zs)}s∈S was given in [11].
In [12], the compound DMMS {(Xs, Ys)}s∈S was studied and
the SK capacity was computed. As related problems, compound
source coding, SK generation with Arbitrarily Varying Channel
(AVC), compound wiretap channels and robust biometric
authentication were studied in [13]–[18].
In this work, a SK generation model for a compound
DMMS with one-way communication in presence of an
eavesdropper is studied. The terminals observe a compound
source S := {XY Z, s}s∈S := {(Xs, Ys, Zs)}s∈S , and two
of them generate a shared SK by using only a one-way
communication over a public noiseless channel while keeping
it secret from the third terminal (eavesdropper). As the source
realization index s ∈ S is unknown to the terminals, an
estimation method such as hypothesis testing is incorporated to
find the marginal source index of the transmitter. This approach
is used to generalize the result in [5, Theorem 2.6], [7, Theorem
17.21] to the compound setup for the source S.
In Section II, the model for SK generation is presented.
Section III gives the main results. A single-letter lower-bound
for the SK capacity of a finite compound source is derived
as a function of the communication rate constraint over the
public channel. A multi-letter SK capacity formula is computed
as well for the case where the public communication rate is
unconstrained. We proposed these two results which are stated
in Theorems 1 and 2, originally in [19] in which the proof ideas
have been outlined. In the present paper, in contrast, we give
the complete proofs of both theorems as well as the proofs for
random coding and security lemmas. The third and main result
of this work which is not available in [19] gives a single-letter
SK capacity formula for a degraded compound source, where
the set of source states may be infinite and the set of marginal
states is finite. Compared with previous theorems, this result
which is stated in Theorem 3 is more practical in the sense
that the SK capacity is single-letter and also valid for sources
with an infinite set of source states S. The complete formal
proofs are given in Section IV. Section V concludes the paper.
Notation: R and N denote the set of real numbers and
natural numbers respectively. The complement of a set A
is denoted by Ac and the subtraction of two sets A and B
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Fig. 1: SK generation protocol for compound DMMS model
is given by A − B := A ∩ B c. The underlying probability
measure is represented by Pr. The log(·) and exp(·) are to
the basis 2 and ln(·) is the natural logarithm to the basis
e. For any function f , the cardinal number of the range of
the function is denoted by ‖f‖. Random Variables (RVs) are
denoted by capital letters (e.g. Xn, U, · · · ), their realizations
by small letters (e.g. xn, u, · · · ), their ranges (alphabets) by
script letters (e.g. Xn,U , · · · ), and their Probability Distri-
butions (PDs) by Roman letters (e.g. PXn ,PU , · · · ). All
alphabets corresponding to RVs are supposed to be finite.
H(X) and I(X;Y ) represent the entropy of a RV X and
the mutual information between X and Y respectively. h(a)
with a ∈ [0, 1] is the binary entropy function and is given
by h(a) := −a log a− (1− a) log(1− a). For any two proba-
bility measures P and Q, ‖P−Q‖ := ∑x∈X |P(x)−Q(x)|
denotes their 1-norm distance. 1A(·) denotes the indicator
function for a set A. EU [X] represents the expectation of
a RV X with respect to the RV U . A stochastic matrix
W : X → P(Y) is a function from the set X to P(Y),
where P(Y) is the set of all PDs defined on the set Y . Finally,
X − Y − Z denotes a Markov chain for RVs X , Y , and Z.
II. SK GENERATION MODEL
Figure 1 shows the SK generation model which is
used throughout this work. Transmitter (Alice), receiver
(Bob) and eavesdropper (Eve) observe a compound DMMS
S = {XY Z, s}s∈S for time duration n ∈ N. It is assumed
that all terminals know the set of source states S as well as its
statistics with PDs {PXY Z,s}s∈S . However, they do not have
the knowledge of the actual realization s ∈ S of the source
statistic. Therefore, RVs Xns , Y
n
s and Z
n
s represent their initial
knowledge for the source state s ∈ S. The next definition
describes the model which is studied through out this work.
Definition 1. The SK generation model consists of a transmitter
(Alice), a receiver (Bob), an eavesdropper (Eve), a compound
DMMS by which their initial knowledge is given, and a public
noiseless communication channel between all terminals. The
source is given for an arbitrary set of states S , by a sequence
of generic RVs S = {XY Z, s}s∈S taking their values in the
finite set X × Y × Z .
As RVs Xns and Y
n
s are correlated, Alice and Bob may
generate some CR by communicating over the public channel.
In this work, only a one-way communication over the public
channel, initiated by Alice, is allowed. The following definition
gives a more precise description of this procedure.
Definition 2. A one-way SK generation protocol for the model
in Definition 1 with source S = {XY Z, s}s∈S consists of the
following two steps:
• After observing Xns , Alice transmits a message fc(X
n
s ) to
Bob over the public noiseless channel. fc is called public
communication function.1
• Next, Alice generates a SK, represented by a RV KA,
based on her knowledge Xns and Bob generates a
SK, represented by a RV KB, based on his knowledge
(Y ns , fc(X
n
s )). KA and KB take their values in K.
As the communication over the public channel is overheard
by Eve, this should not reveal any information about the SK.
Moreover, the generated SK should have a uniform distribution.
Combining these two criteria together leads to a compact notion,
called security index, which was first introduced in [6].
Definition 3. For RVs KA and V , taking values in the sets K
and V respectively, the security index is given by
S(KA|V ) := log(|K|)−H(KA) + I(KA;V ).
In our context, KA represents the SK and V Eve’s knowledge.
This short notion is a powerful tool which can be used to
describe both strong secrecy [20] and the uniformity of the
generated SK. The next definition, uses this concept to define
an achievable SK rate and capacity of a compound source.
Definition 4. A real number Rsk ≥ 0 is an achievable SK
rate for the model in Definition 1 with compound source
S = {XY Z, s}s∈S and a one-way communication over the
public noiseless channel with rate constraint Γ ∈ (0,+∞], if
and only if, for all δ > 0, and all n ∈ N large enough, there
exists a SK generation protocol with public communication
function fc, giving rise to the RVs KA and KB with values in
K, for which it holds:
1
n
log ‖fc‖ < Γ + δ, (1)
Rsk <
1
n
log |K|+ δ, (2)
∀s ∈ S, Pr(KA 6= KB) < δ, (3)
∀s ∈ S, S(KA|Zns , fc(Xns )) < δ. (4)
The SK capacity Csk(S,Γ) for this model is defined to
be the supremum of all achievable SK rates. If there is no
communication rate constraint, i.e. Γ =∞, then condition (1)
in the definition is inactive and the capacity is simply denoted
by Csk(S).
Similarly as in [5], [7], the communication rate constraint is
also part of the achievability definition. This is because, in a
1Similarly as in [7, Problem 17.15(a)], it can be shown that a randomized
fc in the one-way SK generation protocol does not increase the SK capacity.
Therefore, the communication function fc is assumed to be a deterministic
function of Xns and no randomization is considered here.
3realistic model where the communication cost is an important
parameter, the information exchange rate between the terminals
is restricted.
In the following, a subset of the compound set S is defined.
This definition is required for stating the results in Section III.
Definition 5. Let for the compound source S = {XY Z, s}s∈S ,
Sˆ be the set of all possible states of marginal RV X . For a
given marginal state sˆ ∈ Sˆ, corresponding to the RV Xsˆ, the
set of all possible source states is given by
I(sˆ) :=
{
s ∈ S :∀x ∈ X ,∑
y∈Y
∑
z∈Z
PXY Z,s(x, y, z) = PXsˆ(x)
}
. (5)
III. SK CAPACITY RESULTS
In this section, SK capacity results of compound DMMS
models are presented. Moreover, short proof sketches are
provided for the first and third theorems. The complete formal
proofs are given in Section IV. For all theorems which are stated
in this section, the sets Sˆ and I(sˆ) are given by Definition 5.
In the following, Theorem 1 gives a single-letter lower-bound
for the capacity of a compound DMMS source model with a
finite set of source states where the public communication rate
is limited.
Theorem 1. For a finite compound DMMS model with a
source S = {XY Z, s}s∈S and a one-way communication over
a public noiseless channel with constraint Γ ∈ (0,∞], it holds:
Csk(S,Γ) ≥ min
sˆ∈Sˆ
max
Usˆ,Vsˆ{
min
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Vsˆ;Ys|Usˆ)− max
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Vsˆ;Zs|Usˆ)
}
, (6)
where the outer max is taken over all RVs Usˆ and Vsˆ such
that it holds:
∀s ∈ I(sˆ), Usˆ − Vsˆ −Xsˆ − YsZs and
max
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Usˆ;Xsˆ|Ys) + max
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Vsˆ;Xsˆ|UsˆYs) < Γ. (7)
Proof sketch: To achieve the SK rate in (6), Alice estimates
her marginal state sˆ ∈ Sˆ by hypothesis testing such that
the estimation error is exponentially small [21]. Similarly as
in [12], she sends this along with other information related to
her observation over the public channel to Bob. In Figure 1,
this is denoted by fc(Xns ). Given an estimated marginal source
state of Alice sˆ ∈ Sˆ , the joint source state s is not necessarily
known to the terminals. However, by Definition 5, it is known
that s ∈ I(sˆ).
For the correctly estimated Alice’s state, say sˆ ∈ Sˆ , Lemma 7
from Subsection IV-A, assures that Alice and Bob can generate
some CR by using their knowledge with an exponentially small
error. This CR is universal for all source states s ∈ I(sˆ).
Furthermore, the public communication rate should be lower
than a given Γ > 0. Therefore, the coding scheme, introduced
in Lemma 7, should work with respect to this limitation
which is given by (7). This problem for the case where no
communication constraint is given is easier to solve and a
non-compound version is available in [7, Problem 17.15b].
Finally, as seen in Figure 1, Alice and Bob generate their
SKs KA and KB based on the CR by using a SK generator.
However, fc(Xns ) is also received by Eve. Lemma 8, again
from Subsection IV-A, assures the existence of a SK generator
which guarantees the strong secrecy and the uniformity of the
SK KA, for all possible s ∈ I(sˆ).
As a second result, a multi-letter SK capacity formula
is computed for the case, in which no communication rate
constraint is given and the set of source states is again finite.
Theorem 2. For a finite compound DMMS model with a
source S = {XY Z, s}s∈S and a one-way communication over
a public noiseless channel, it holds:
Csk(S) = lim
n→∞
1
n
min
sˆ∈Sˆ
max
Usˆ,Vsˆ{
min
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Vsˆ;Y
n
s |Usˆ)− max
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Vsˆ;Z
n
s |Usˆ)
}
, (8)
where the outer max is taken over all RVs Usˆ and Vsˆ such
that it holds:
∀s ∈ I(sˆ), Usˆ − Vsˆ −Xnsˆ − Y ns Zns . (9)
Finally as the main result, a single-letter SK capacity formula
is given in the following for a degraded compound source with
an arbitrary set of source states S which might be infinite.
Theorem 3. Consider a compound DMMS model with a source
S = {XY Z, s}s∈S with an arbitrary set S, a finite set of
marginal states Sˆ , and a one-way communication over a public
noiseless channel. If the following Markov chains are satisfied,
∀sˆ ∈ Sˆ, ∀r, t ∈ I(sˆ), Xsˆ − Yr − Zt, (10)
then it holds:
Csk(S) = min
sˆ∈Sˆ
{
inf
r∈I(sˆ)
I(Xsˆ;Yr)− sup
t∈I(sˆ)
I(Xsˆ;Zt)
}
. (11)
Proof sketch: In the first step, the achievability result from
Theorem 1 is used to show that the SK rate in (11) is achievable
for a finite set of source states S.
Next, for the infinite source S = {XY Z, s}s∈S , fix the
marginal PD PXsˆ and define the infinite family of stochastic ma-
trices {PY Z,s|Xsˆ : X → P(Y×Z)}s∈I(sˆ). By using Lemma 5
from Subsection IV-A, it follows that there exists a finite family
of stochastic matrices {Ws′ : X → P(Y ×Z)}s′∈I′(sˆ), which
approximates the infinite family. The finite set I ′(sˆ) contains
all indices of this finite family for the given sˆ.
Define the finite source S′ := {XY Z, s′}s′∈I′(sˆ),sˆ∈Sˆ by
PXY Z,s′(x, y, z) := PXsˆ(x)Ws′(y, z|x) for all s′ ∈ I ′(sˆ),
sˆ ∈ Sˆ, and (x, y, z) ∈ X × Y × Z . It is shown that the SK
generation protocol, which is used for the finite source S′,
also guarantees the achievability of the given rate in (11) for
the infinite source S.
The orders of Markov chains in Theorem 3 are crucial in
determining the SK capacity. For example, assume that the
orders of (10) are changed as given in the following,
∀sˆ ∈ Sˆ, ∀r, t ∈ I(sˆ), Xsˆ − Zt − Yr.
In this case the capacity is Csk(S) = 0. This is because, by [4,
Theorem 1], it holds that
∀sˆ ∈ Sˆ, ∀r, t ∈ I(sˆ), Csk(S) ≤ I(Xsˆ;Yr|Zt) = 0.
4IV. PROOFS
This section is divided into 3 parts. Subsection IV-A gives
a short review of definitions and results which are required in
the proofs. In Subsection IV-B, Lemmas 7 and 8 for random
coding and security are presented. Finally, Subsection IV-C
presents the formal proofs of Theorems 1, 2, and 3.
A. Preliminaries
For the typical sequences and their related sets the same
definitions as in [7, Chapters 2 and 17] are taken. Let N(x|xn)
give the number of repetitions of an element x in the sequence
xn and N(x, y|xn, yn) the number of repetitions of the pair
(x, y) in the pair sequence (xn, yn). For two RVs X and Y and
stochastic matrix PY |X : X → P(Y), the following definitions
are used when  > 0:
T n[XY ] :=
{
(xn, yn) ∈ Xn × Yn : ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y,∣∣PXY (x, y)− 1
n
N(x, y|xn, yn)∣∣ ≤ 
∧ (PXY (x, y) = 0⇒ N(x, y|xn, yn) = 0)},
T n[Y |X](xn) :=
{
yn ∈ Yn : ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y,∣∣ 1
n
N(x|xn)PY |X(y|x)− 1
n
N(x, y|xn, yn)∣∣ ≤ 
∧ (PY |X(y|x) = 0⇒ N(x, y|xn, yn) = 0)},
T n[XY ](xn) :=
{
yn ∈ Xn : (xn, yn) ∈ T n[XY ]
}
.
In the following, a series of lemmas and propositions is
provided which will be used in the proofs.
Lemma 1 ([7]). Let U,X, and Y be RVs taking value in U ,X ,
and Y respectively. Assume 0 < ξ < ζ < σ, and τ > 0 are all
in R and n ∈ N. Then, it holds that
1) ∀xn ∈ T n[X]ξ, T n[XY ]ζ(xn) ⊃ T n[Y |X]ζ−ξ(xn).
2) PnX(T n[X]ξ) ≥ 1− 2|X |e−2ξ
2n.
3) ∀τ > 0, ∀ξ > 0 sufficiently small, and ∀xn ∈ T n[X]ξ, it
holds
∣∣− 1n log PnX(xn)−H(X)∣∣ < τ.
4) ∀τ > 0, ∀ξ > 0 sufficiently small, and ∀n ∈ N
sufficiently large, it holds
∣∣ 1
n log |T n[X]ξ| −H(X)
∣∣ < τ.
5) ∀τ > 0, ∀ζ > 0 sufficiently small, ∀n ∈ N suffi-
ciently large, and ∀un with T n[UX]ζ(un) 6= ∅ it holds∣∣ 1
n log |T n[UX]ζ(un)| −H(X|U)
∣∣ < τ.
6) For U −X − Y and ∀(un, xn) ∈ T n[UX]ξ it holds
PnY |X
(T n[UXY ]σ(un, xn)|xn)≥1−2|U||X ||Y|e−2(σ−ξ)2n.
7) ∀τ > 0, ∀ζ > 0 sufficiently small, ∀n ∈ N sufficiently
large, and ∀yn ∈ Yn if T n[XY ]ζ(yn) 6= ∅ then it holds∣∣∣− 1n log PnX(T n[XY ]ζ(yn))− I(X;Y )∣∣∣ < τ.
8) ∀τ > 0, ∀ζ > 0 sufficiently small, ∀n ∈ N sufficiently
large, and ∀(un, yn) ∈ Un×Yn if T n[UXY ]ζ(un, yn) 6= ∅
then it holds∣∣− 1n log PnX|U(T n[UXY ]ζ(un, yn)|un)−I(X;Y |U)∣∣ < τ.
Lemma 2 ([7]). Let RVs U and X take their values in U and
X respectively. Consider N = exp(nR) sequences unl with
l ∈ L := {1, 2 · · ·N}, which are independently drawn by a
PD PnU with I(U ;X) < R. Then for all τ ∈ (0, R− I(U ;X)),
all ζ > 0 sufficiently small, all n ∈ N sufficiently large, and
all xn such that T n[UX]ζ(xn) 6= ∅, it holds that∣∣∣∣ 1n log ∣∣∣{l ∈ L : unl ∈ T n[UX]ζ(xn)}∣∣∣− (R− I(U ;X))
∣∣∣∣ < τ,
with a probability approaching one, doubly exponentially fast.
Lemma 3 ([7]). Let RVs U, V, and X take their values in U ,V,
and X respectively. Consider N = exp(nR) sequences vnl with
l ∈ L := {1, 2 · · ·N}, which are independently drawn by a PD
PnV |U (.|un) for a given un with I(V ;X|U) < R. Then for all
τ ∈ (0, R−I(V ;X|U)), all σ > 0 sufficiently small, all n ∈ N
sufficiently large, and all xn such that T n[UVX]σ(un, xn) 6= ∅,
it holds that∣∣∣∣ 1n log ∣∣∣{l∈L :vnl ∈T n[UVX]σ(un, xn)}∣∣∣−(R−I(V ;X|U))
∣∣∣∣<τ,
with a probability approaching one, doubly exponentially fast.
This holds uniformly for all given un ∈ Un.
Lemma 4 ( [7], [22]). Let , η > 0 and λ > 0 all in R
and k ∈ N be given and U be a RV taking value in U . If
PU ({u ∈ U : PU (u) ≤ 1λ}) ≥ 1 − η, then for a randomly
selected function κ : U → {1, 2, · · · , k} it holds,
Pr
(∥∥κ(PU )− P0∥∥ > + 2η) ≤ 2ke−λ2(1−η)2k(1+) ,
where P0(i) = 1/k for all i = 1, 2, · · · k. Random selection
means that the κ(u), u ∈ U are chosen independently and
identically distributed (iid) uniformly.
Lemma 5 ( [23]). Let S be an arbitrary set and possibly
infinite and {Ws : X → P(U)}s∈S be a family of stochastic
matrices. For every l ∈ N with l ≥ 2|U|2, there exists a family
of stochastic matrices {Ws′ : X → P(U)}s′∈S′ with a finite
set S ′, such that |S ′| ≤ (l + 1)|X×U|, where the following
properties hold: ∀s ∈ S, ∃s′ ∈ S ′,∀x ∈ X ,∀u ∈ U ,
|Ws(u|x)−Ws′(u|x)|≤ 1
l
|U|, Ws(u|x) ≤ e2|U|2/lWs′(u|x).
Lemma 6 ([24]). Let (X,Y ) and (X ′, Y ′) be two pairs of RVs
taking values in X ×Y with PDs PXY and PX′Y ′ respectively.
Furthermore, let γ := 12‖PXY −PX′Y ′‖ and γ ≤ 1− 1|X×Y| .
Then, it holds that
|I(X;Y )− I(X ′;Y ′)| ≤ 3γ log(|X × Y| − 1) + 3h(γ).
B. Random Coding and Security Lemmas
In this subsection, Lemmas 7 and 8 for finite compound sets
with their proofs are presented. Similar techniques which are
used in the non-compound versions in [7, Lemmas 17.5 and
17.22], [5], [25], are used in the following proofs and extended
to the compound setup. For completeness, we present all proofs
in detail. These lemmas are required for the proof of Theorem 1.
Assume in Lemma 7, if the values in the equations (12), (13),
(14), and (15) are not integer numbers, then the smallest integer
which is larger than the given expression is taken.
5Lemma 7. Let δ > 0 and σ > ζ > 0 be all in R and
sufficiently small. Furthermore, let Alice’s state sˆ ∈ Sˆ be given
and for all s ∈ I(sˆ), RVs Xsˆ and Ys take their values in X
and Y respectively. Let also RVs Usˆ and Vsˆ be given such that
for all s ∈ I(sˆ) the Markov chains Usˆ − Vsˆ −Xsˆ − Ys hold.
Assume Nsˆ,1Nsˆ,2 random sequences unij(sˆ) ∈ Un, chosen
independently according to PD PnUsˆ , are given and known to
Alice and Bob where
i ∈ I := {1, 2, · · · , Nsˆ,1}, j ∈ J := {1, 2, · · · , Nsˆ,2},
Nsˆ,1 := exp
[
n
(
max
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Usˆ;Xsˆ|Ys) + 3δ
)]
, (12)
Nsˆ,2 := exp
[
n
(
min
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Usˆ;Ys)− 2δ
)]
. (13)
Moreover, let for each unij(sˆ), Nsˆ,3Nsˆ,4 random sequences
vijpq
n
(sˆ) ∈ Vn, chosen conditionally independently according to
PnVsˆ|Usˆ(·|unij(sˆ)), be given and known to Alice and Bob where
p ∈ P := {1, 2, · · · , Nsˆ,3}, q ∈ Q := {1, 2, · · · , Nsˆ,4},
Nsˆ,3 := exp
[
n
(
max
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Vsˆ;Xsˆ|UsˆYs) + 3δ
)]
, (14)
Nsˆ,4 := exp
[
n
(
min
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Vsˆ;Ys|Usˆ)− 2δ
)]
. (15)
Then CR can be generated between Alice and Bob in two ways:
a) For n ∈ N sufficiently large, there exist encoder functions
f : T → I and g : T → J , with a probability approaching 1,
doubly exponentially fast where
T :=
{
xn ∈ Xn : T n[UX,sˆ]ζ(xn) 6= ∅
}
, (16)
and if f(xn) = i, g(xn) = j then (unij(sˆ), x
n) ∈ T n[UX,sˆ]ζ .
Alice encodes her observation xn ∈ T by these functions to
the sequence unij(sˆ) where j is the CR.
For functions f and g, extending their domain to Xn by
defining for all xn 6∈ T , f(xn) = g(xn) = 0, there exists a
decoder g˜ : I × Sˆ × Yn → J such that for all s ∈ I(sˆ),
Pr
{
g(Xnsˆ ) 6= g˜
(
f(Xnsˆ ), sˆ, Y
n
s
)}
< exp(−nδ0), (17)
for some δ0 > 0. Thus, Bob can reconstruct g(xn) = j from
(f(xn), sˆ, yn) for given realizations Xnsˆ = x
n and Y ns = y
n.
b) For each f and g from part a), and n ∈ N sufficiently
large, there exist encoder functions ϕ : T → P and ρ : T → Q
with a probability approaching 1, doubly exponentially fast,
such that if f(xn) = i, g(xn) = j, ϕ(xn) = p, ρ(xn) = q
then (unij(sˆ), v
ij
pq
n
(sˆ), xn) ∈ T n[UVX,sˆ]σ. Alice encodes her
observation xn ∈ T by these functions to the sequence vijpqn(sˆ)
where q is the CR.
For functions ϕ and ρ, extending their domain to Xn by
defining for all xn 6∈ T , ϕ(xn) = ρ(xn) = 0, there exists
a decoder ρ˜ : I × J × P × Sˆ × Yn → Q such that for all
s ∈ I(sˆ),
Pr
{
ρ(Xnsˆ ) 6= ρ˜
(
f(Xnsˆ ), g(X
n
sˆ ), ϕ(X
n
sˆ ), sˆ, Y
n
s
)}
< exp(−nδ′0), (18)
for some δ′0 > 0. Thus, Bob can reconstruct ρ(x
n) = q from
(f(xn), g(xn), ϕ(xn), sˆ, yn) for given realizations Xnsˆ = x
n
and Y ns = y
n.
Proof: a) Let R be the rate of choosing the sequences
{unij(sˆ)}(i,j)∈I×J which implies that Nsˆ,1Nsˆ,2 = exp(nR).
Therefore, by (12) and (13) and properties of the Markov
chain, it follows that
R = max
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Usˆ;Xsˆ|Ys) + min
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Usˆ;Ys) + δ
= I(Usˆ;Xsˆ) + max
s∈I(sˆ)
[I(Usˆ;Ys|Xsˆ)− I(Usˆ;Ys)]
+ min
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Usˆ;Ys) + δ = I(Usˆ;Xsˆ) + δ. (19)
Similarly as in [7, Lemma 17.22], for all xn ∈ T , it holds by
the definition in (16) that T n[UX,sˆ]ζ(xn) 6= ∅. Thus, Lemma 2
together with (19) implies for all τ ∈ (0, R− I(Usˆ;Xsˆ)), all
ζ > 0 sufficiently small, all n ∈ N sufficiently large, and all
xn ∈ T that
1
n
log
∣∣∣{(i, j) ∈ I × J : unij(sˆ) ∈T n[UX,sˆ]ζ(xn)}∣∣∣
≥ R− I(Usˆ;Xsˆ)− τ,
with a probability approaching one, doubly exponentially fast.
Therefore, for each xn ∈ T , the number of chosen sequences
unij(sˆ) which are in T n[UX,sˆ]ζ(xn) is non-zero and the functions
f and g as mentioned in the lemma, do exist with this
probability.
Define for all i ∈ I and yn ∈ Yn, the decoder as follows:
g˜(i, sˆ, yn) :=

j if j∈J, unij(sˆ)∈
⋃
s∈I(sˆ)
T n[UY,s]σ|X |(yn)
and ∀m ∈ J ,m 6= j ⇒
unim(sˆ) 6∈
⋃
s∈I(sˆ)
T n[UY,s]σ|X |(yn)
0 otherwise.
(20)
Moreover, define
T0 :=
{
(xn, yn) ∈ Xn×Yn : xn ∈ T
∧ (unf(xn)g(xn)(sˆ), xn, yn) ∈
⋃
s∈I(sˆ)
T n[UXY,s]σ
}
.
In the following, it is shown that Alice and Bob’s observation
(xn, yn) ∈ Xn × Yn is in the set T0 with a probability
exponentially close to one. It holds that
PnXY,s(T0c)
=
∑
xn∈T c,yn∈Yn
PnXY,s(x
n, yn) +
∑
xn∈T ,(xn,yn) 6∈T0
PnXY,s(x
n, yn)
= PnXsˆ(T c) +
∑
xn∈T ,(xn,yn) 6∈T0
PnXsˆ(x
n)
× PnYs|Xsˆ
( ⋂
s∈I(sˆ)
T n[UXY,s]σc (unf(xn)g(xn)(sˆ), xn)
∣∣xn). (21)
Lemma 1.1 implies for every xn ∈ T n[Xsˆ]ξ with ξ ∈ (0, ζ) thatT n[UX,sˆ]ζ(xn) 6= ∅ for n large enough. Thus by the definition
in (16), it follows that T ⊃ T n[Xsˆ]ξ and thus Lemma 1.2 implies
for some c0 > 0 that
PnXsˆ(T c) < exp(−nc0). (22)
On the other hand, for every xn ∈ T with f(xn) = i and
g(xn) = j, it holds that (unij(sˆ), x
n) ∈ T n[UX,sˆ]ζ . Since for all
6s ∈ I(sˆ), the Markov chains Usˆ −Xsˆ − Ys hold, Lemma 1.6
implies for c0 sufficiently small that
PnYs|Xsˆ
(T n[UXY,s]σc (unf(xn)g(xn)(sˆ), xn)|xn) < exp(−nc0).
This inequality together with (21) and (22) gives
PnXY,s(T c0 ) < exp(−nc1), (23)
for some c1 > 0 and n sufficiently large.
Therefore, to compute the upper-bound of the probability
in (17), we may just concentrate on all (xn, yn) ∈ T0 with
g˜(f(xn), sˆ, yn) 6= g(xn). (24)
A necessary condition for (xn, yn) ∈ T0 is given by
(unf(xn)g(xn)(sˆ), y
n) ∈
⋃
s∈I(sˆ)
T n[UY,s]σ|X |,
which together with (24) and (20) implies that
∃m 6= g(xn), (unf(xn)m(sˆ), yn) ∈
⋃
s∈I(sˆ)
T n[UY,s]σ|X |. (25)
Furthermore, it follows for all (xn, yn) ∈ T0 that xn ∈ T
and thus for f(xn) = i and g(xn) = j 6= m, it holds that
(unij(sˆ), x
n) ∈ T n[UX,sˆ]ζ . (26)
Define the RV
U˜sˆ := {Unij,sˆ}(i,j)∈I×J = (Un11,sˆ, Un12,sˆ, · · · , Un|I||J |,sˆ)
and let u˜(sˆ) := {unij(sˆ)}(i,j)∈I×J be an arbitrary realization.
For all s ∈ I(sˆ) and (xn, yn) ∈ T0, the relations (25) and (26)
give the following upper-bound for the error probability in (17)
es
(
u˜(sˆ)
)
:=
∑
(xn,yn)∈T0
PnXY,s(x
n, yn)
×
∑
i∈I,j∈J
m∈J−{j}
1T n
[UX,sˆ]ζ
(unij(sˆ), x
n)1⋃
s∈I(sˆ)
T n
[UY,s]σ|X|
(unim(sˆ), y
n).
The upper-bound of es(u˜(sˆ)) is given by taking its expecta-
tion with respect to U˜sˆ as follows
EU˜sˆ
[
es(U˜sˆ)
]
=
∑
(xn,yn)∈T0
PnXY,s(x
n, yn)
∑
i∈I,j∈J
m∈J−{j}
E(Unij,sˆ,Unim,sˆ)
[
1T n
[UX,sˆ]ζ
(Unij,sˆ, x
n)1 ⋃
s∈I(sˆ)
T n
[UY,s]σ|X|
(Unim,sˆ, y
n)
]
, (27)
where the equality follows by RVs {Unij,sˆ}(i,j)∈I×J being
independent and using the Fubini theorem [26, Chapter II,
§6]. In the following, an upper-bound for the inner summation
in (27) is derived, which automatically gives the upper-bound
for the expectation on the left hand side.
Let i ∈ I, j ∈ J ,m ∈ J −{j} and τ, τ ′ > 0 be given such
that δ > τ + τ ′. It holds for all (xn, yn) ∈ T0, all ζ, σ > 0
sufficiently small, and n sufficiently large that
E(Unij,sˆ,Unim,sˆ)
[
1T n
[UX,sˆ]ζ
(Unij,sˆ, x
n)1⋃
s∈I(sˆ)
T n
[UY,s]σ|X|
(Unim,sˆ, y
n)
]
= Pr
(
Unij,sˆ∈T n[UX,sˆ]ζ(xn)
)
Pr
(
Unim,sˆ∈
⋃
s∈I(sˆ)
T n[UY,s]σ|X |(yn)
)
≤ |I(sˆ)| exp
[
− n( I(Usˆ;Xsˆ)
+ min
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Usˆ;Ys)− τ − τ ′
)]
, (28)
where the equality follows again by RVs {Unij,sˆ}(i,j)∈I×J
being independent. The inequality is a result of Lemma 1.7.
Moreover, the definitions in (12) and (13) imply that
Nsˆ,1Nsˆ,2(Nsˆ,2 − 1) ≤ Nsˆ,1Nsˆ,2Nsˆ,2
= exp
[
n
(
I(Usˆ;Xsˆ) + min
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Usˆ;Ys)− δ
) ]
. (29)
By using (28) and (29), it follows that the inner summation
in (27) is upper-bounded by
∣∣I(sˆ)∣∣ exp [ − n(δ − τ − τ ′)],
which implies that
EU˜sˆ
[
es(U˜sˆ)
]
≤ |I(sˆ)| exp [− n(δ − τ − τ ′)]. (30)
Let δ1 be sufficiently small such that 0 < δ1 < δ − τ − τ ′.
By the Markov inequality, it follows that
Pr
(
es(U˜sˆ) ≥ exp(−nδ1)
)
≤
EU˜sˆ
[
es(U˜sˆ)
]
exp(−nδ1) . (31)
Therefore, (30) and (31) imply for all ζ and σ sufficiently
small, and all n large enough that
Pr
( ⋂
s∈I(sˆ)
{
es(U˜sˆ)< exp(−nδ1)
})
≥ 1− |I(sˆ)|2 exp(−n(δ−τ−τ ′−δ1)). (32)
Thus, there exists a realization u˜(sˆ) = {unij(sˆ)}(i,j)∈I×J
of the RV U˜sˆ, where for all s ∈ I(sˆ) and (xn, yn) ∈ T0,
the upper-bound of the error probability in (17) is given by
exp(−nδ1). This implies by using (23) that the total error
probability in (17) is exponentially small with some δ0 > 0.
b) The proof of the second part is very similar to the first part.
For a given (i, j)∈I × J , the number of chosen random se-
quences vijpq
n is Nsˆ,3Nsˆ,4 = exp(nR′), where R′ is the rate of
choosing the random sequences. Similar to (19), conditions (14)
and (15) imply that R′ = I(Vsˆ;Xsˆ|Usˆ) + δ. Furthermore, as
a result of Lemma 1.1, from (unij(sˆ), x
n) ∈ T n[UX,sˆ]ζ follows
T n[UVX,sˆ]σ(unij(sˆ), xn) 6= ∅. Therefore, Lemma 3 implies that
functions ϕ and ρ as mentioned in the lemma do exist.
According to part a) of this lemma, Bob is able to reconstruct
g(xn) = j, by knowing f(xn), sˆ and yn. Therefore, he knows
also unij(sˆ). Let ϑ ∈ R be given such that ϑ > σ. Similar
to (20), the decoder is defined as ρ˜(i, j, p, sˆ, yn) := q if
q ∈ Q, vijpq
n
(sˆ)∈
⋃
s∈I(sˆ)
T n[UV Y,s]ϑ|X |(unij(sˆ), yn) and
∀r ∈ Q, r 6= q ⇒ vijpr
n
(sˆ) 6∈
⋃
s∈I(sˆ)
T n[UV Y,s]ϑ|X |(unij(sˆ), yn),
and otherwise zero. Define the set T ′0 as follows. Similar to (23),
the probability PnXY,s(T ′0 c) is exponentially small.
T ′0 :=
{
(xn, yn) ∈ Xn × Yn : xn ∈ T
∧(unf(xn)g(xn)(sˆ), vf(x
n)g(xn)
ϕ(xn)ρ(xn)
n
(sˆ), xn, yn)∈
⋃
s∈I(sˆ)
T n[UVXY,s]ϑ
}
.
For a given (i, j)∈I×J define V˜ij,sˆ :={V ijpq,sˆ
n}(p,q)∈P×Q and
let v˜ij(sˆ) := {vijpqn(sˆ)}(p,q)∈P×Q be an arbitrary realization.
7Define for all (xn, yn) ∈ T ′0 with f(xn) = i, g(xn) = j,
es
(
v˜ij(sˆ)
)
:=
∑
p∈P, q∈Q
r∈Q−{q}
1 ⋃
s∈I(sˆ)
T n
[UVXY,s]ϑ
(unij(sˆ), v
ij
pq
n
(sˆ), xn, yn)
× 1⋃
s∈I(sˆ)
T n
[UV Y,s]ϑ|X|
(unij(sˆ), v
ij
pr
n
(sˆ), yn). (33)
Similarly as in part a), it can be shown that the error probability
in (18) is upper-bounded for all (xn, yn) ∈ T ′0 by∑
i∈I,j∈J
∑
(xn,yn)∈T ′0
f(xn)=i, g(xn)=j
PnXY,s(x
n, yn) es
(
v˜ij(sˆ)
)
. (34)
For τ, τ ′ > 0 with τ + τ ′ < δ, Lemma 1.8 implies that
E(V ijpq,sˆn,V ijpr,sˆn)
[
1 ⋃
s∈I(sˆ)
T n
[UVXY,s]ϑ
(unij(sˆ), V
ij
pq,sˆ
n
, xn, yn)
× 1 ⋃
s∈I(sˆ)
T n
[UV Y,s]ϑ|X|
(unij(sˆ), V
ij
pr,sˆ
n
, yn)
∣∣ Unij,sˆ = unij(sˆ)]
≤ ∣∣I(sˆ)∣∣2 · exp [− n( I(Vsˆ;Xsˆ|Usˆ)
+ min
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Vsˆ;Ys|Usˆ)− τ − τ ′)
)]
. (35)
Moreover, by (14) and (15), it follows that
Nsˆ,3Nsˆ,4(Nsˆ,4 − 1) ≤ Nsˆ,3Nsˆ,4Nsˆ,4
= exp
[
n
(
I(Vsˆ;Xsˆ|Usˆ) + min
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Vsˆ;Ys|Usˆ)− δ
) ]
. (36)
Thus, (35) and (36) imply by using the definition in (33) that
EV˜ij,sˆ
[
es(V˜ij,sˆ)
∣∣Unij,sˆ=unij(sˆ)]≤ ∣∣I(sˆ)∣∣2exp[−n(δ−τ−τ ′)].
Therefore, it follows for all 0 < δ′1 < δ − τ − τ ′ that
Pr
( ⋂
s∈I(sˆ)
{
es(V˜ij,sˆ) < exp(−nδ′1)
} ∣∣∣ Unij,sˆ=unij(sˆ))
≥ 1− ∣∣I(sˆ)∣∣3 exp (− n(δ − τ − τ ′ − δ′1)).
This implies that there exist sequences v˜ij(sˆ), for which the
error upper-bound in (34) is exponentially small.
Lemma 8. Let Alice’s state sˆ ∈ Sˆ be given and C,Ds, and Sˆsˆ
with s ∈ I(sˆ) be RVs taking value in C,D, and Sˆ respectively.
RVs C and Ds denote the CR and part of Eve’s Knowledge
respectively. Assume α ∈ (0, 16 ] and η ∈ (0, 13 ] with α ≤ η are
given and for all s ∈ I(sˆ), there exist sets Bs ⊂ C × D with
∀(c, d) ∈ Bs, PCD,s|Sˆsˆ(c, d|sˆ) < (α|Bs|)−1, (37)
PCD,s|Sˆsˆ(Bs|sˆ) ≥ 1− (η2 − α2). (38)
Furthermore, define the sets Bs,d :=
{
c ∈ C : (c, d) ∈ Bs
}
and Ds :=
{
d ∈ D : Bs,d 6= ∅
}
, and assume
k∈N, k <α6 min
s∈I(sˆ),d∈Ds
|Bs,d|, k <e1/α(2|D| |I(sˆ)|)−1. (39)
Then, there exists a SK generator κ : C → {1, 2, · · · , k} which
maps the CR to a SK κ(C) such that for all s∈I(sˆ),
S
(
κ(C)|Ds, Sˆsˆ = sˆ
) ≤ (α+ 2η) log k + h(α+ η), (40)
with a probability at least 1−2k |I(sˆ)| |D| e−α
5 min |Bs,d|
k where
the min in the exponent is taken over all s ∈ I(sˆ) and d ∈ Ds.
Proof: Let s ∈ I(sˆ) be given. Define:
λ := α3 · min
s∈I(sˆ),d∈Ds
|Bs,d|, (41)
D′s :=
{
d ∈ D : PDs|Sˆsˆ(d|sˆ) ≥
α2|Bs,d|
|Bs|
}
, (42)
B′s := Bs ∩ (C × D′s), (43)
Gs :=
{
(c, d) ∈ C × D : PC|DSˆ,s(c|d, sˆ) ≤
1
λ
}
, (44)
Gs,d :=
{
c ∈ C : (c, d) ∈ Gs
}
, (45)
Es :=
{
d ∈ D : PC|DSˆ,s(Gs,d|d, sˆ) < 1− η
}
. (46)
Similarly as in [7, Lemma 17.5], we show in the first step
that the following inequality is true:
PDs|Sˆsˆ(Es|sˆ) < η. (47)
This inequality is required later to show that (40) holds. For
this, let (c, d) ∈ B′s be given and s ∈ I(sˆ). It follows that
PC|DSˆ,s(c|d, sˆ) =
PCD,s|Sˆsˆ(c, d|sˆ)
PDs|Sˆsˆ(d|sˆ)
≤ (α|Bs|)
−1
α2|Bs,d||Bs|−1 ≤
1
λ
,
where the first inequality follows by (37), (42), and (43) and
the last one by (41). This implies by the definition in (44) that
B′s ⊂ Gs . (48)
Moreover, by (42) and (43) it holds for all s ∈ I(sˆ) that
PDs|Sˆsˆ(D′cs |sˆ) =
∑
d∈D′cs
PDs|Sˆsˆ(d|sˆ) <
∑
d∈D
α2|Bs,d|
|Bs| =α
2, (49)
PCD,s|Sˆsˆ(Bs ∪ (C × D′s)|sˆ)
= PCD,s|Sˆsˆ(Bs|sˆ) + PDs|Sˆsˆ(D′s|sˆ)− PCD,s|Sˆsˆ(B′s|sˆ). (50)
The relations (49) and (50) together with the assumption (38)
of the lemma imply that
PCD,s|Sˆsˆ(B′s|sˆ)≥ PCD,s|Sˆsˆ(Bs|sˆ)− PDs|Sˆsˆ(D′cs |sˆ)
≥ 1− (η2 − α2)− α2 = 1− η2. (51)
By (48) and (51), it follows that PCD,s|Sˆsˆ(Gs| sˆ) ≥ 1 − η2.
This implies by the definition in (45) for all s ∈ I(sˆ) that
1− η2 ≤
∑
d∈D
PDs|Sˆsˆ(d|sˆ)PC|DSˆ,s(Gs,d|d, sˆ)
<
∑
d∈Es
PDs|Sˆsˆ(d|sˆ)(1− η) +
∑
d 6∈Es
PDs|Sˆsˆ(d|sˆ)
= −η
∑
d∈Es
PDs|Sˆsˆ(d|sˆ) + 1,
where the second inequality follows by (46). The desired
relation (47) follows by simplifying this inequality.
In the second step, we show that a SK generator κ,
satisfying (40), exists. For this, consider each member of the
family of PDs PC|DSˆ,s(.|d, sˆ) with d 6∈ Es and s ∈ I(sˆ).
Lemma 4 implies for a randomly selected SK generator κ that
Pr
(∥∥κ(PC|DSˆ,s(.|d, sˆ))−P0∥∥>2(α+ η))≤ 2ke−λα2k , (52)
where P0(i) = 1/k for all i = 1, 2 · · · k. The universal upper-
bound in (52) was calculated by taking  = 2α in Lemma 4 and
8by the inequalities α ≤ 1/6 and η ≤ 1/3 from the assumption
of the lemma. Therefore, for the following events
As,d :=
{∥∥κ(PC|DSˆ,s(.|d, sˆ))− P0∥∥ ≤ 2(α+ η)},
it follows by (41) and (52) that
Pr
( ⋂
s∈I(sˆ),d6∈Es
As,d
)
≥ 1−
∑
s∈I(sˆ),d6∈Es
Pr
(Acs,d)
≥ 1− 2k |D| |I(sˆ)|e−
α5 min |Bs,d|
k , (53)
where the min in (53) is taken over all s ∈ I(sˆ) and d ∈ Ds.
This means that a SK generator κ satisfies the relation
‖κ(PC|DSˆ,s(.|d, sˆ))− P0‖ ≤ 2(α+ η) simultaneously for all
d 6∈ Es and s ∈ I(sˆ) with the probability stated in (53).
Therefore, it holds by the same probability that
S
(
κ(C)|Ds, Sˆsˆ = sˆ
)
=
∑
d∈D
PDs|Sˆsˆ(d|sˆ)
[
log k−H(κ(C)|Ds = d, Sˆsˆ = sˆ)]
≤
∑
d6∈Es
PDs|Sˆsˆ(d|sˆ)
[
(α+ η) log k + h(α+ η)
]
+
∑
d∈Es
PDs|Sˆsˆ(d|sˆ) log k ≤ (α+ 2η) log k + h(α+ η),
which gives the desired relation in (40). The equality is the
result of Definition 3 and the first inequality follows from the
uniform continuity of entropy [24], [7, Problem 3.10]. The last
step is a result of the inequality (47). Moreover, by combining
the two assumptions in (39), it implies that
k ln
(
2k|D| · |I(sˆ)| ) < α5 · min
s∈I(sˆ),d∈Ds
|Bs,d|,
and consequently, the probability in (53) is non-zero.
C. Proof of Main Results
In the following, the proofs of Theorems 1, 2, and 3 are
presented. For the proof of the first two theorems, similar
techniques which are used for deriving the non-compound
SK capacity results in [7, Theorem 17.21], [5], are used and
extended to the finite compound setup. For completeness, all
proofs are presented in detail. The proof of Theorem 3 is based
on an approximation technique and uses Lemmas 5 and 6.
Proof of Theorem 1: Let δ > 0, and 0 < ξ < ζ < σ, all
in R be given. For each sˆ ∈ Sˆ = {sˆ1, . . . sˆm}, let Usˆ and Vsˆ
satisfy for all s ∈ I(sˆ) the Markov chains Usˆ−Vsˆ−Xsˆ−YsZs.
Consider Nsˆ,1Nsˆ,2 sequences unij(sˆ) ∈ Un as given in
Table I, which are chosen independently by PD PnUsˆ with
i ∈ I := {1, 2, · · · , Nsˆ,1}, j ∈ J := {1, 2, · · · , Nsˆ,2},
and Nsˆ,1 and Nsˆ,2 satisfying (12) and (13) from Lemma 7.
Moreover, for every unij(sˆ) from Table I, consider Nsˆ,3Nsˆ,4
sequences vijpq
n
(sˆ) ∈ Vn , which are chosen conditionally
independently by PD PnVsˆ|Usˆ(.|unij(sˆ)) with
p ∈ P := {1, 2, · · · , Nsˆ,3}, q ∈ Q := {1, 2, · · · , Nsˆ,4},
and Nsˆ,3 and Nsˆ,4 satisfying (14) and (15) from Lemma 7.
Assume that the random sequences unij(sˆ) in Table I and their
sˆ1 un11(sˆ1) · · · unij(sˆ1) · · · unNsˆ1,1Nsˆ1,2 (sˆ1)
...
...
...
...
sˆm un11(sˆm) · · · unij(sˆm) · · · unNsˆm,1Nsˆm,2 (sˆm)
Table I: Random sequences for a DMMS with |Sˆ| = m
corresponding sequences {vijpqn(sˆ)}(p,q)∈P×Q are known to
Alice and Bob.
To show the achievability of (6), the proof is divided into two
parts. In part a), the following rate is shown to be achievable:
R′sk := min
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Usˆ;Ys)− max
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Usˆ;Zs), (54)
when R′sk is positive and RV Usˆ satisfies for all s ∈ I(sˆ)
Usˆ −Xsˆ − YsZs and max
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Usˆ;Xsˆ|Ys) < Γ. (55)
This gives a special case of (6) and (7). In part b), the
achievability of the SK rate in (6) is shown, when it is positive.
Part a) Assume R′sk from (54) is positive i.e.
min
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Usˆ;Ys) > max
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Usˆ;Zs). (56)
As explained in Section III, Alice estimates her marginal
statistic by hypothesis testing. Assume that sˆ ∈ Sˆ is the index
corresponding to the correct decision and all other s˜ ∈ Sˆ − {sˆ}
correspond to a wrong decision. For any observation Xnsˆ , let
the resulting estimated state be denoted by the RV Sˆsˆ, taking
value in the set Sˆ and having the PD PSˆsˆ . It holds by [21]
and [7, Problem 2.13b] for some c0, c1 > 0 that
PSˆsˆ(sˆ) ≥ 1− exp(−nc0), (57)
∀s˜ ∈ Sˆ − {sˆ}, PSˆsˆ(s˜) ≤ exp(−nc1). (58)
Next, Alice sends her estimated marginal source state to Bob
over the public noiseless channel. Assume that the hypothesis
testing has led to the correct decision sˆ. Alice and Bob find
the corresponding family of sequences {unij(sˆ)}(i,j)∈I×J from
Table I by knowing sˆ. Lemma 7a implies the existence of the
encoder functions f : Xn → I ∪ {0} and g : Xn → J ∪ {0}.
These encoders give the indices f(xn) = i and g(xn) = j of
the sequence unij(sˆ) to be chosen from the family of sequences
{unij(sˆ)}(i,j)∈I×J .
As shown in Figure 2, in addition to the transmitted sˆ,
Alice sends further the index f(xn) = i to Bob over the
public channel. Lemma 7a implies the existence of a decoder
g˜ : I × Sˆ × Yn → J , with which, Bob can reconstruct the
index g(xn) = j. This j is the CR between Alice and Bob.
In total, for all Alice’s estimation results which may lead to a
correct or incorrect decision, the error probability upper-bound
for all s ∈ I(sˆ) is given by
Pr
{
g(Xnsˆ ) 6= g˜
(
f(Xnsˆ ), Sˆsˆ, Y
n
s
)}
= Pr
{
g(Xnsˆ ) 6= g˜
(
f(Xnsˆ ), sˆ, Y
n
s
)∧ Sˆsˆ= sˆ}
+
∑
s˜∈Sˆ−{sˆ}
PSˆsˆ(s˜)Pr
{
g(Xnsˆ ) 6= g˜
(
f(Xnsˆ ), Sˆsˆ, Y
n
s
) ∣∣ Sˆsˆ= s˜}
≤ exp(−nδ0) + exp(−nc1) · |Sˆ|, (59)
9where the inequality is a result of (17) for some δ0 > 0 and (58).
Thus, condition (3) of Definition 4 is satisfied.
The whole message which is sent over the public channel is
represented by the RV fc(Xnsˆ ) = (f(X
n
sˆ ), Sˆsˆ) having the range
size ‖f‖ · |Sˆ|. As shown in the following, the communication
rate satisfies condition (1) of Definition 4:
1
n
log ‖fc‖ = 1
n
log(‖f‖ · |Sˆ|) = 1
n
log(Nsˆ,1 · |Sˆ|)
= max
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Usˆ;Xsˆ|Ys) + 3δ + 1
n
log |Sˆ| < Γ+ 3δ,
where the last equality follows by (12) and the inequality is a
result of (55) and is valid for all n sufficiently large.
After the index g(xn) = j is reconstructed by Bob, both
Alice and Bob may generate their SK, based on this CR.
Thus, it remains to show that there exists a SK generator
κ : J → {1, 2 · · · , k}, giving rise to the RV KA = κ(g(Xnsˆ )),
which satisfies condition (4) of Definition 4.
Again the condition is verified for both estimation results.
Assume hypothesis testing has led to the correct decision and
sˆ is sent to Bob over the public channel. Define for s ∈ I(sˆ)
Ts :=
{
(xn, zn) ∈Xn ×Zn : xn ∈ T ∧
(unf(xn)g(xn)(sˆ), x
n, zn) ∈ T n[UXZ,s]σ
}
,
where T is given in (16). A similar discussion as for (23) from
Lemma 7, implies for some c2 > 0 and n large enough that
PnXZ,s(T cs ) < exp(−nc2). (60)
Similarly as in [7, Theorem 17.21] for the non-compound
version, define for all s ∈ I(sˆ), the RVs C and Ds and the
set Bs to be used in Lemma 8, as follows
C := g(Xnsˆ ), Ds :=
(
f(Xnsˆ ), Z
n
s ,1Ts(X
n
sˆ , Z
n
s )
)
,
Bs :=
{(
j, (i, zn, 1)
)
: (i, j) ∈ I × J , zn ∈ T n[Zs]ξ,
T n[UXZ,s]σ(unij(sˆ), zn) 6= ∅
}
. (61)
Assume, RVs C and Ds take their values in the sets C and
D respectively. Moreover, the sets Ds and Bs,d are defined
as in Lemma 8. In the following, it will be shown that all
conditions of Lemma 8 are satisfied. It holds that
PCD,s|Sˆsˆ(Bs|sˆ) =
∑
(j,(i,zn,1))∈Bs
PCD,s|Sˆsˆ
(
j, (i, zn, 1)|sˆ)
=
∑
(j,(i,zn,1))∈Bs
∑
xn:f(xn)=i,g(xn)=j,
1Ts (x
n,zn)=1
PXnsˆ Zns |Sˆsˆ(x
n, zn|sˆ)
= PXnsˆ Zns |Sˆsˆ
(
Ts ∩
{
(xn, zn)∈Xn×Zn : zn∈T n[Zs]ξ
} ∣∣ sˆ)
≥ 1−
[
PXnsˆ Zns |Sˆsˆ(T
c
s |sˆ) + PZns |Sˆsˆ(T
n
[Zs]ξ
c|sˆ)
]
≥ 1−
PXnsˆ Zns (T cs )+PZns (T n[Zs]ξc)
1− exp(−nc0) ≥ 1− exp(−nc3), (62)
for some c3 > 0 and n sufficiently large. The last two
inequalities follow by (57), (60) and Lemma 1.2.
Furthermore, define the parameters α and η for some
arbitrary τ > 0 as follows
α := exp(−n(δ + 5τ)), η := exp(−nδ). (63)
Alice Bob
Public Channel
(i, sˆ)
j j
xn yn
{unij(sˆ)}(i,j)∈I×J {unij(sˆ)}(i,j)∈I×J
Fig. 2: Generating the CR j
For δ and τ sufficiently small and n large enough, it holds
that η2 − α2 > exp(−nc3). Therefore, it follows by (62) that
PCD,s|Sˆsˆ(Bs|sˆ) ≥ 1− (η2 − α2).
This guarantees condition (38) of Lemma 8. Moreover, the
conditions α ∈ (0, 1/6] and η ∈ (0, 1/3] are also satisfied.
To check condition (37) of Lemma 8, we find first
an upper-bound of |Bs|. The non-emptiness constraint
T n[UXZ,s]σ(unij(sˆ), zn) 6= ∅ from the definition of the set Bs is
a sufficient condition for unij(sˆ) ∈ T n[UZ,s]σ|X |(zn) and thus
|Bs| ≤
∑
zn∈T n
[Zs]ξ
∣∣∣{(i, j) ∈ I × J : unij(sˆ) ∈ T n[UZ,s]σ|X |(zn)}∣∣∣.
(64)
Furthermore, for R being the rate of choosing the random
sequences {unij(sˆ)}(i,j)∈I×J , it holds by (12) and (13) that
R = max
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Usˆ;Xsˆ|Ys) + min
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Usˆ;Ys) + δ
> min
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Usˆ;Ys) > max
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Usˆ;Zs),
where the last inequality is the result of the assumption (56).
Moreover, for all (j, (i, zn, 1)) ∈ Bs it holds that zn ∈ T n[Zs]ξ
which implies by using Lemma 1.1 for n large enough that
T n[UZ,s]ζ(zn) 6= ∅. Therefore, it follows by (64) and Lemma 2
for ξ and ζ sufficiently small and n large enough that
|Bs| ≤
∣∣T n[Zs]ξ∣∣ exp [n(R− I(Usˆ;Zs) + τ)]
≤ exp
[
n
(
H(Zs) + τ
)]
× exp
[
n
(
I(Usˆ;Xsˆ) + δ − I(Usˆ;Zs) + τ
)]
, (65)
where the last inequality follows by (19) and Lemma 1.4.
In the second step of verifying condition (37), we
find an upper-bound for PCD,s|Sˆsˆ
(
j, (i, zn, 1)|sˆ). For all
(j, (i, zn, 1)) ∈ Bs, it holds by using (57) and (61) that(
1− exp(−nc0)
) · PCD,s|Sˆsˆ(j, (i, zn, 1)|sˆ)
≤ PCD,s
(
j, (i, zn, 1)
)
≤
∑
xn∈T n
[UXZ,s]σ
(unij(sˆ),z
n)
PnXZ,s(x
n, zn)
≤ ∣∣T n[UXZ,s]σ(unij(sˆ), zn)∣∣ exp[−n(H(XsˆZs)−τ)]
≤ exp
[
n
(
H(Xsˆ|UsˆZs)−H(XsˆZs) + 2τ
)]
, (66)
where the third inequality follows by Lemma 1.3 and the last
one by Lemma 1.5 for σ sufficiently small and n large enough.
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Moreover, by using Markov chains in (55), it holds that
H(Xsˆ|UsˆZs)−H(XsˆZs)
= −I(Usˆ;Xsˆ)−H(Zs) + I(Usˆ;Zs). (67)
The relations (65), (66), and (67) together with the definition
of α in (63) imply for n large enough that
|Bs|PCD,s|Sˆsˆ
(
j, (i, zn, 1)|sˆ)α ≤ exp(−nτ)
1− exp(−nc0) < 1.
Thus, condition (37) of Lemma 8 is also satisfied.
Therefore, Lemma 8 implies that there exists a SK generator
κ : J → {1, 2, · · · , k} with k satisfying (39), such that the
relation (40) holds. By the definitions in (63), both α and η
approach zero exponentially fast. Moreover, by (39) and (65),
it follows that k does not increase faster than exponentially.
Thus, the inequality (40) implies for KA = κ(g(Xnsˆ )) that
S
(
KA
∣∣ f(Xnsˆ ), Zns ,1Ts(Xnsˆ , Zns ), Sˆsˆ = sˆ)
≤ (α+ 2η) log k + h(α+ η)
≤ n · exp(−nc4) + exp(−nc4) ≤ exp(−nc5), (68)
for some c4, c5 > 0. Consequently, the security index is
exponentially small for the case of correct estimation decision.
In total, for all estimation results which may lead to a correct
or incorrect decision, the security index is upper-bounded as
shown in the following
S
(
KA
∣∣ f(Xnsˆ ), Zns ,1Ts(Xnsˆ , Zns ), Sˆsˆ)
= PSˆsˆ(sˆ)S
(
KA|Zns , f(Xnsˆ ),1Ts(Xnsˆ , Zns ), Sˆsˆ = sˆ
)
+
∑
s˜∈Sˆ−{sˆ}
PSˆsˆ(s˜)S
(
KA|Zns , f(Xnsˆ ),1Ts(Xnsˆ , Zns ), Sˆsˆ= s˜
)
≤ exp(−nc5) + n · exp(−nc6) · |Sˆ|,
for some c6 > 0. The last inequality is a result of (58) and (68)
and the fact that k does not increase faster than exponentially.
Therefore, condition (4) of Definition 4 is satisfied.
In the rest of this part, we show that R′sk satisfies condi-
tion (2) of Definition 4. By using the definition of α from (63)
and the set D being the alphabet of RV Ds, it follows that
the expression e1/α(2|D| |I(sˆ)|)−1 from (39) increases doubly
exponentially fast. For any d := (i, zn, 1) ∈ Ds and Bs,d from
Lemma 8, it follows by (65) that |Bs,d| does not increase faster
than exponentially. Therefore, for n large enough, it holds that
α6 · min
s∈I(sˆ),d∈Ds
∣∣Bs,d∣∣ < e1/α(2|D| |I(sˆ)|)−1. (69)
Thus, to guarantee condition (39) of Lemma 8 it is necessary
that k be lower than the left hand side of (69). For this, a lower-
bound for mins∈I(sˆ),d∈Ds |Bs,d| should be first determined.
Lemma 1.1 implies that unij(sˆ) ∈ T n[UZ,s]ζ(zn) is a sufficient
condition for T n[UXZ,s]σ(unij(sˆ), zn) 6= ∅. Therefore for all
s ∈ I(sˆ) and d = (i, zn, 1) ∈ Ds, it holds that∣∣Bs,d∣∣ ≥ ∣∣∣{j ∈ J : unij(sˆ) ∈ T n[UZ,s]ζ(zn)}∣∣∣. (70)
Furthermore by using (13), the rate of choosing the random
sequences unij(sˆ) for a fixed index i, is given by
R2 = min
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Usˆ;Ys)− 2δ. (71)
Alice Bob
Public Channel
(i, p, sˆ)
q q
xn yn
{unij(sˆ)}(i,j)∈I×J
{vijpqn(sˆ)}(p,q)∈P×Q
{unij(sˆ)}(i,j)∈I×J
{vijpqn(sˆ)}(p,q)∈P×Q
Fig. 3: Generating the CR q
Thus, for δ sufficiently small, assumption (56) gives
R2 > max
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Usˆ;Zs). (72)
Moreover, in deriving the inequality (65), it was shown that for
all (j, d) =
(
j, (i, zn, 1)
) ∈ Bs, it holds that T n[UZ,s]ζ(zn) 6= ∅.
Thus, Lemma 2 together with (70), (71), and (72) implies that
min
s∈I(sˆ),d∈Ds
|Bs,d| ≥ min
s∈I(sˆ),d∈Ds
∣∣∣{j : unij(sˆ) ∈ T n[UZ,s]ζ(zn)}∣∣∣
≥ exp
[
n
(
R2 − max
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Usˆ;Zs)− τ
)]
≥ exp
[
n
(
min
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Usˆ;Ys)−max
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Usˆ;Zs)−2δ−τ
)]
.
Therefore, by keeping k lower than the left hand side of (69),
it follows by (63) and (54) that 1n log |K| > R′sk − 8δ. This
satisfies condition (2) of Definition 4.
Part b) In this part, it is shown that if
Rsk := min
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Vsˆ;Ys|Usˆ)− max
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Vsˆ;Zs|Usˆ) > 0,
then Rsk is achievable for all RVs Usˆ and Vsˆ satisfying (7). It
may be assumed that
min
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Usˆ;Ys) ≤ max
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Usˆ;Zs). (73)
Because otherwise, it follows by Markov chains in (7) that
Rsk = min
s∈I(sˆ)
[
I(Vsˆ;Ys) + I(Usˆ;Ys|Vsˆ)− I(Usˆ;Ys)
]
− max
s∈I(sˆ)
[
I(Vsˆ;Zs) + I(Usˆ;Zs|Vsˆ)− I(Usˆ;Zs)
]
≤ min
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Vsˆ;Ys)− max
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Vsˆ;Zs)
−
[
min
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Usˆ;Ys)− max
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Usˆ;Zs)
]
,
which implies by using part a) that Rsk is achievable.
Similarly as in part a), Alice sends her estimated marginal
source state to Bob over the public noiseless channel. For the
case that hypothesis testing has led to the correct decision sˆ,
both Alice and Bob find the corresponding family of sequences
{unij(sˆ)}(i,j)∈I×J from Table I and also the related families of
sequences {vijpqn(sˆ)}(p,q)∈P×Q for each member of the chosen
row of the table. Lemma 7b implies the existence of the encoder
functions ϕ : Xn → P ∪ {0} and ρ : Xn → Q∪ {0}. These
encoders give the indices ϕ(xn) = p and ρ(xn) = q of the
sequence vijpq
n
(sˆ) to be chosen from the family of sequences
{vijpqn(sˆ)}(p,q)∈P×Q for given indices i and j.
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As shown in Figure 3, in addition to the transmitted sˆ, Alice
sends further the indices f(xn) = i and ϕ(xn) = p to Bob
over the public channel. By part a) of this theorem, g(xn) = j
is known to Bob. Lemma 7b implies the existence of a decoder
ρ˜ : I×J ×P×Sˆ×Yn → Q, with which Bob can reconstruct
the index q to be used as the CR. The upper-bound of the error
probability was given in (18) from Lemma 7. Due to (73), the
index g(xn) = j can not be used as the CR any more.
Similarly as in (59) from part a), for all estimation results
which may lead to a correct or incorrect decision, the error
probability upper-bound for all s ∈ I(sˆ) is exponentially small.
Therefore, condition (3) of Definition 4 is satisfied.
The public communication function is represented by the RV
fc(X
n
sˆ ) = (f(X
n
sˆ ), ϕ(X
n
sˆ ), Sˆsˆ). As shown in the following,
the communication rate satisfies condition (1) of Definition 4:
1
n
log
(‖f‖ · ‖ϕ‖ · |Sˆ|) = max
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Usˆ;Xsˆ|Ys)+
max
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Vsˆ;Xsˆ|UsˆYs) + 6δ + 1
n
log |Sˆ| < Γ + 6δ,
for n sufficiently large. The equality is a result of (12) and (14)
from Lemma 7 and the inequality follows by (7).
For showing that conditions (2) and (4) of Definition 4
also hold, the RVs C,Ds, and the set Bs can be defined
similarly as in part a), but this time for the coding scheme from
Lemma 7b). It can be shown that conditions (37) and (38) of
Lemma 8 are again satisfied and thus there exists a SK generator
κ : Q → {1, 2 · · · , k}, giving rise to the RV K = κ(ρ(Xnsˆ )),
which satisfies conditions (2) and (4) of Definition 4. The proof
follows by a similar discussion as in part a) of this theorem
for compound sources. The non-compound version is available
in [7, Theorem 17.21].
Proof of Theorem 2: For the direct part of the proof,
replace Xsˆ, Ys, and Zs in Theorem 1 with Xnsˆ , Y
n
s , and Z
n
s
respectively, for arbitrary n ∈ N, sˆ ∈ Sˆ, and s ∈ I(sˆ). This
implies that the SK rate
1
n
min
sˆ∈Sˆ
max
Usˆ,Vsˆ
{
min
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Vsˆ;Y
n
s |Usˆ)− max
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Vsˆ;Z
n
s |Usˆ)
}
is achievable for any n ∈ N, where the outer max is taken
over all RVs Usˆ and Vsˆ satisfying (9).
To show the achievability of (8), we have to show that the
limit in (8) exists. Similarly as in [16], the proof follows by
using the Fekete’s lemma [27] which states that if a sequence
an is superadditive i.e. an+m ≥ an + am, then lim
n→∞ an/n
exists. Define the sequences
an(sˆ) := max
Usˆ,Vsˆ
{
min
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Vsˆ;Y
n
s |Usˆ)− max
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Vsˆ;Z
n
s |Usˆ)
}
,
an := min
sˆ∈Sˆ
an(sˆ). (74)
Take two arbitrary independent Markov chains
Usˆ,1 − Vsˆ,1 −Xnsˆ,1 − Y ns,1Zns,1 , (75)
Usˆ,2 − Vsˆ,2 −Xmsˆ,2 − Y ms,2Zms,2 , (76)
such that m,n ∈ N and it holds:
Uˆsˆ :=(Usˆ,1, Usˆ,2), Vˆsˆ :=(Vsˆ,1, Vsˆ,2), X
n+m
sˆ :=(X
n
sˆ,1, X
m
sˆ,2),
Y n+ms :=(Y
n
s,1, Y
m
s,2), Z
n+m
s :=(Z
n
s,1, Z
m
s,2).
As the two Markov chains are independent, any RV from (75)
is independent of all RVs in (76) and vice versa. Therefore,
the Markov chain Uˆsˆ− Vˆsˆ−Xn+msˆ − Y n+ms Zn+ms holds and
an+m(sˆ)
= max
Uˆsˆ,Vˆsˆ
{
min
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Vˆsˆ;Y
n+m
s |Uˆsˆ)− max
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Vˆsˆ;Z
n+m
s |Uˆsˆ)
}
≥ max
Uˆsˆ,Vˆsˆ
{
min
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Vsˆ,1;Y
n
s,1|Usˆ,1)− max
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Vsˆ,1;Z
n
s,1|Usˆ,1)
+ min
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Vsˆ,2;Y
m
s,2|Usˆ,2)− max
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Vsˆ,2;Z
m
s,2|Usˆ,2)
}
= an(sˆ) + am(sˆ).
Thus, by taking the minimum from both sides of this
inequality and using the definition in (74), it follows that
an+m ≥ min
sˆ∈Sˆ
{an(sˆ) + am(sˆ)}
≥ min
sˆ∈Sˆ
{an(sˆ)}+ min
sˆ∈Sˆ
{am(sˆ)} = an + am.
Therefore, the limit in (8) exists and is achievable.
For the converse, let Rsk > 0 be an achievable SK rate and
s ∈ S be given. Assume that sˆ ∈ Sˆ is the state of the marginal
RV X and thus s ∈ I(sˆ). Alice sends a message fc(Xnsˆ ) to
Bob over the public channel and generates a SK represented
by RV K = KA. It holds by Definition 3 and condition (4) of
Definition 4, that for all δ > 0 and n sufficiently large,
1
n
log |K| − 1
n
min
s∈I(sˆ)
H
(
KA|Zns , fc(Xnsˆ )
)
< δ. (77)
Moreover, by the Fano’s inequality, it holds that
1
n
max
s∈I(sˆ)
H
(
KA|Y ns , fc(Xnsˆ )
)
<
1
n
δ log |K|+ 1
n
. (78)
By adding (77) and (78), it follows that
1
n
log|K| < 1
n
[
min
s∈I(sˆ)
H
(
KA|Zns , fc(Xnsˆ )
)
− max
s∈I(sˆ)
H
(
KA|Y ns , fc(Xnsˆ )
)]
+
1
n
δ log |K|+ 1
n
+ δ.
Thus, by using condition (2) of Definition 4, it follows for
 = δ/(1− δ) + (n(1− δ))−1 + δ, and n sufficiently large that
Rsk <
1
n
log |K|+ δ ≤ 1
1− δ ·
1
n
[
min
s∈I(sˆ)
I
(
KA;Y
n
s |fc(Xnsˆ )
)
− max
s∈I(sˆ)
I
(
KA;Z
n
s |fc(Xnsˆ )
)]
+ ,
where the last inequality follows by adding and subtracting the
term H(KA|fc(Xnsˆ )).
Set RVs Usˆ := fc(Xnsˆ ) and Vsˆ := (fc(X
n
sˆ ),KA). It holds
that I(Xnsˆ ;Usˆ|Vsˆ) = 0. Furthermore, as fc(Xnsˆ ) and KA are
both functions of Xnsˆ , it implies that I(Y
n
s , Z
n
s ;UsˆVsˆ|Xnsˆ ) = 0.
This proves that the Markov chains in (9) are valid.
Finally, by taking the maximum with respect to Usˆ and Vsˆ
and the minimum with respect to sˆ ∈ Sˆ, it follows for δ > 0
sufficiently small and n large enough that
Rsk≤ 1
n
min
sˆ∈Sˆ
max
Usˆ,Vsˆ
[
min
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Vsˆ;Y
n
s |Usˆ)−max
s∈I(sˆ)
I(Vsˆ;Z
n
s |Usˆ)
]
,
which completes the proof.
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Proof of Theorem 3: The achievability of the SK rate
in (11) for a finite source follows directly from the special
case of Theorem 1. By taking RV Usˆ to be Xsˆ in part a) of
the proof of Theorem 1 in (54), it follows that the given rate
in (11) for a finite S is achievable.
To show the achievability of the SK rate in (11) for an
infinite set of source states S and a finite set of marginal
states Sˆ, let sˆ ∈ Sˆ be given and consider the infinite class of
stochastic matrices as follows:
{PY Z,s|Xsˆ : X → P(Y × Z)}s∈I(sˆ). (79)
Similarly as in [17], Lemma 5 implies that for any
l > 2|Y × Z|2, there exists a finite set of stochastic matrices
{Ws′ :X→P(Y×Z)}s′∈I′(sˆ), with |I ′(sˆ)|≤(l+1)|X×Y×Z|,
which approximates the one in (79) such that
∀s ∈ I(sˆ), ∃s′ ∈ I ′(sˆ), ∀(x, y, z) ∈ X × Y × Z,∣∣PY Z,s|Xsˆ(y, z|x)−Ws′(y, z|x)∣∣ ≤ 1l |Y×Z|, (80)
PY Z,s|Xsˆ(y, z|x) ≤ e
2|Y×Z|2
l Ws′(y, z|x). (81)
As sˆ ∈ Sˆ was chosen arbitrarily, we may repeat this
procedure for all sˆ ∈ Sˆ and define the following finite source
S′ := {XY Z, s′}s′∈I′(sˆ),sˆ∈Sˆ ,
where for all sˆ ∈ Sˆ, s′ ∈ I ′(sˆ), and (x, y, z) ∈ X × Y × Z ,
the PD of S′ is given by
PXY Z,s′(x, y, z) := PXsˆ(x)Ws′(y, z|x).
Define for a marginal index sˆ and indices r, t ∈ I(sˆ),
f(sˆ, r, t) := I(Xsˆ;Yr)− I(Xsˆ;Zt). (82)
Since S′ is a finite source, the following SK rate is again by
using Theorem 1 achievable:
min
sˆ∈Sˆ
min
r′,t′∈I′(sˆ)
f(sˆ, r′, t′).
In the following, it is shown that the SK generation protocol
which guarantees the achievability of this SK rate for the finite
source S′, also guarantees the achievability of the SK rate
given in (11) for the infinite source S when l = n3.
By using (80) and taking l = n3, it follows for all r, t ∈ I(sˆ)
and their corresponding indices r′, t′ ∈ I ′(sˆ) that
γ1 :=
1
2
‖PXY,r − PXY,r′‖ ≤ 1
2n3
|Y × Z|2,
γ2 :=
1
2
‖PXZ,t − PXZ,t′‖ ≤ 1
2n3
|Y × Z|2.
Since γ1 ≤ 1− (|X ||Y|)−1 and γ2 ≤ 1− (|X ||Z|)−1 hold
for n large enough, it follows by Lemma 6 that
|I(Xsˆ;Yr)−I(Xsˆ;Yr′)| ≤ 3γ1 log(|X × Y|) + 3h(γ1), (83)
|I(Xsˆ;Zt)−I(Xsˆ;Zt′)| ≤ 3γ2 log(|X × Z|) + 3h(γ2). (84)
By using (82), (83), and (84), it holds that
|f(sˆ, r, t)− f(sˆ, r′, t′)|
≤ |I(Xsˆ;Yr)− I(Xsˆ;Yr′)|+ |I(Xsˆ;Zt)− I(Xsˆ;Zt′)|
≤ 3|Y × Z|
2
2n3
log(|X 2 × Y × Z|) + 6h
( |Y × Z|2
2n3
)
. (85)
As stated before, the protocol related to the finite source S′,
is used for the infinite source S. To show that the SK rate of
this protocol is close to the one which is given in (11), it is
sufficient to show that for a given  > 0 it holds:∣∣min
sˆ∈Sˆ
inf
r,t∈I(sˆ)
f(sˆ, r, t)−min
sˆ∈Sˆ
min
r′,t′∈I′(sˆ)
f(sˆ, r′, t′)
∣∣ < . (86)
Let τ > 0 be given. There exist then r0, t0 ∈ I(sˆ) such that
inf
r,t∈I(sˆ)
f(sˆ, r, t) > f(sˆ, r0, t0)− τ
≥ min
r′,t′∈I′(sˆ)
f(sˆ, r′, t′)− ,
where the second inequality holds for τ small enough and is
a result of (85) and the concavity of entropy. Similarly, there
exist r′0, t
′
0 ∈ I ′(sˆ) such that
min
r′,t′∈I′(sˆ)
f(sˆ, r′, t′) ≥ f(sˆ, r′0, t′0)− τ
> inf
r,t∈I(sˆ)
f
(
sˆ, r, t
)− .
Therefore, as the index sˆ ∈ Sˆ was taken arbitrarily, the
relation (86) follows directly. This implies that condition (2)
of Definition 4 is satisfied for the infinite source S.
For verifying condition (3) of Definition 4, the following
inequality is required which follows by using (81):
PnYs|Xsˆ(y
n|xn) =
n∏
i=1
PYs|Xsˆ(yi|xi)
≤ e 2|Y×Z|
2n
l Vns′(y
n|xn), (87)
where Vs′(y|x) :=
∑
z∈Z Ws′(y, z|x) for any x ∈ X , y ∈ Y .
In order to use the finite protocol for the infinite source
S, the PD of the marginal RV X is estimated by Alice. Let
the correct estimation decision be given by sˆ. The result of
estimation for the source S is identical with the one from the
source S′. Moreover, assume that the encoder g and decoder
g˜ which are given by Lemma 7a), are used to generate the CR.
The error probability upper-bound for all s ∈ I(sˆ) is given by
Pr
{
g(Xnsˆ ) 6= g˜
(
f(Xnsˆ ), Sˆsˆ, Y
n
s
)}
≤ PnXY,s
({
(xn, yn) ∈ Xn×Yn : g(xn) 6= g˜(f(xn), sˆ, yn)})
+
∑
s˜∈Sˆ−{sˆ}
PSˆsˆ(s˜)Pr
{
g(Xnsˆ ) 6= g˜
(
f(Xnsˆ ), Sˆsˆ, Y
n
s
)∣∣Sˆsˆ = s˜}
≤ e 2|Y×Z|
2
l n × PnXsˆ(xn)×Vns′
({
(yn ∈ Yn :
g(xn) 6= g˜(f(xn), sˆ, yn)}∣∣xn)+ exp(−nc1) · |Sˆ|
≤ e 2|Y×Z|
2
l n × PnXY,s′
({
(xn, yn) ∈ Xn×Yn :
g(xn) 6= g˜(f(xn), sˆ, yn)})+ exp(−nc1) · |Sˆ|
≤ e 2|Y×Z|
2
n2 exp(−nδ0) + exp(−nc1) · |Sˆ|,
for some c1, δ0 > 0. The second inequality follows by (87)
and (58). The last inequality is a result of (17) from Lemma 7a)
and that l = n3. Therefore, the error probability is exponentially
small. Furthermore, as |I ′(sˆ)| < (l+1)|X×Y×Z| and l = n3, a
universal δ1 exists for which the probability in (32) is non-zero
and thus such a coding scheme for the finite source S′ exists.
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To show that condition (4) of Definition 4 is also guaranteed,
assume again that the encoder g and decoder g˜ from Lemma 7a)
are used and the correct estimation decision is sˆ. As the protocol
guarantees condition (4) of Definition 4 for the finite source
S′, it holds by using Definitions 3 for all 0 > 0, n sufficiently
large, and s′ ∈ I ′(sˆ) that
S(KA|Zns′ , f(Xnsˆ ), Sˆsˆ= sˆ) = log |K| −H(κ(g(Xnsˆ ))|Sˆsˆ= sˆ)
+I(κ(g(Xnsˆ ));Z
n
s′ , f(X
n
sˆ )|Sˆsˆ= sˆ) < 0, (88)
where KA,K, and κ are given by Definition 2 and Lemma 8.
Furthermore, it holds that
γ3 :=
1
2
∥∥Pκ(g(Xnsˆ ))Zns f(Xnsˆ )|Sˆsˆ(·|sˆ)−Pκ(g(Xnsˆ ))Zns′f(Xnsˆ )|Sˆsˆ(·|sˆ)∥∥
≤ 1
2−2 exp(−nc0)
∥∥Pκ(g(Xnsˆ ))Zns fc(Xnsˆ )−Pκ(g(Xnsˆ ))Zns′fc(Xnsˆ )∥∥
≤ n
∥∥PXZ,s − PXZ,s′∥∥
2−2 exp(−nc0) ≤
|Y × Z|2
2n2(1−exp(−nc0)) , (89)
where RVs f(Xsˆ) with alphabet I and fc(Xnsˆ ) = (f(Xnsˆ ), Sˆsˆ)
are given by Lemma 7a) and proof of Theorem 1. The first
inequality follows by (57) and the second one by the fact
that no mapping of the PDs increases their 1-norm distance.
The last inequality is a result of (80) and that l = n3. Since
γ3 ≤ 1− 1|K×Zn×I| , then for all 1 > 0, Lemma 6 implies by
using (89) that∣∣I(κ(g(Xnsˆ ));Zns , f(Xnsˆ )|Sˆsˆ= sˆ)
− I(κ(g(Xnsˆ ));Zns′ , f(Xnsˆ )|Sˆsˆ= sˆ)
∣∣
≤ 3γ3 log(|K × Zn × I| − 1) + 3h(γ3)
≤ 3|Y × Z|
2c2
2n(1−exp(−nc0)) +3h
( |Y × Z|2
2n2(1−exp(−nc0))
)
<1, (90)
for some c2 > 0 and n sufficiently large. The second inequality
follows by the fact that the argument of the log function does
not increase faster than exponentially. Therefore, it follows by
using (88) and (90) that for all s ∈ I(sˆ),
S(KA|Zns , f(Xnsˆ ), Sˆsˆ= sˆ) < 0 + 1.
This inequality together with (58) implies for all estimation
results which may lead to a correct or incorrect decision that
S(KA|Zns , f(Xnsˆ ), Sˆsˆ) = PSˆsˆ(sˆ)S(KA|Zns , f(Xnsˆ ), Sˆsˆ= sˆ)
+
∑
s˜∈Sˆ−{sˆ}
PSˆsˆ(s˜)S
(
KA|Zns , f(Xnsˆ ), Sˆsˆ= s˜
)
≤ 0 + 1 + |Sˆ| exp(−nc1).
The existence of the SK generator κ for the finite source S′
follows by applying the relation |I ′(sˆ)| < (n3 + 1)|X×Y×Z|
to (39) and (69), so that the probability in (53) is non-zero.
For the converse proof, assume that Rsk is achievable. The
result from [4, Theorem 1] implies that
Rsk ≤ min
sˆ∈Sˆ
inf
r,t∈I(sˆ)
I(Xsˆ;Yr|Zt). (91)
Furthermore, for any given sˆ ∈ Sˆ and all r, t ∈ I(sˆ), it holds
by (10) that
I(Xsˆ;Yr)− I(Xsˆ;Zt) = I(Xsˆ;Yr|Zt).
This identity together with (91) completes the proof.
V. CONCLUSION
The SK generation protocol which was introduced in this
work used a two phase approach to achieve the given SK
rate. In the first step, Alice estimated her state and sent this
along with other information which was obtained from her
observation to Bob. Although, this information is also received
by Eve, it was shown that the strong secrecy and uniformity
of the generated SK is still guaranteed. In the second step,
Bob used this information including the estimated state of
Alice to generate the SK. A single-letter lower-bound for the
SK capacity of a finite compound source was derived as a
function of the communication rate constraint between Alice
and Bob. This result was further extended to a multi-letter
SK capacity formula by discarding the public communication
rate constraint. As the final result, a single-letter SK capacity
formula was derived for degraded compound sources with
no communication constraint and an arbitrary set of source
states. It was shown that for any infinite compound source,
with finite marginal set of states, there exists an approximating
finite source whose SK generation protocol also guarantees the
achievability of the given rates for the infinite source.
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